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Upper bounds of eavesdropper’s performances in finite-length code with decoy method
Masahito Hayashi1, ∗
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5-28-3, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan
Security formulas of quantum key distribution (QKD) with imperfect resources are obtained for
finite-length code when the decoy method is applied. This analysis is useful for guaranteeing the
security of implemented QKD systems. Our formulas take into account the effect of the vacuum
state and dark counts in the detector. We compare the asymptotic key generation rate in presence
of dark counts with that without.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk,03.67.-a,05.30.Jp
I. INTRODUCTION
The BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and
Brassard[1] in 1984 attracts attention as an alternative to
modern cryptography based on complexity theory. Many
efforts are devoted to searching for implementations of
quantum communication channels for this purpose. The
security of the original BB84 protocol can be trivially
proved only when the quantum communication channel is
noiseless. Since there is noise in any implemented quan-
tum channel, it is needed to prove the security with the
noisy channel, which has been proved by Mayers[2]. After
his proof, many different proofs were reported. However,
any implemented quantum channel, besides loss, also suf-
fers imperfections in generating a single photon. That is,
the sent pulse is given as a mixture of the vacuum state,
the single-photon state, and the multi-photon state, and
it is impossible for the sender (Alice) and the receiver
(Bob) to identify the number of photon. In order to
guarantee the security in such a case, the decoy method
has been proposed[3, 4, 5, 6], in which different kinds
of pulses are transmitted. However, these preceding re-
searches did not provide security with the finite-length
code, which is a basic requirement in practical settings.
That is, there is no established method to evaluate quan-
titively the security of an implementable quantum key
distribution (QKD) system.
On the other hand, modern cryptographic methods are
required to evaluate its security quantitively. Hence, for
the practical use of QKD, it is needed a theoretical analy-
sis in order to present quantitive criteria for security and
to establish the method to guarantee this criteria for the
implemented QKD system. If nothing in this direction
is done, QKD systems cannot be developed for practical
use.
In a usual QKD protocol, the final key is generated via
classical error correction and privacy amplification after
the initial key (raw key) is generated by the quantum
communication. In the classical error correction part, it
is sufficient to choose our classical error correction code
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based on the detected error rate. Privacy amplification,
on the other hands, sacrifices several keys in order to
guarantee the security against the eavesdropper. The
upper bound of eavesdropper(Eve)’s information for the
final key is closely related to the amount of sacrifice bits.
Since Eve’s information for the final key is the measure
of the possibility of eavesdropping, its quantitive evalua-
tion is required. In order to decrease Eve’s information
sufficiently, we need a sufficient amount of sacrifice bits,
which is given by the product between the length of our
code and the rate of sacrifice bits. A larger size of our
code requires larger complexity of the privacy amplifi-
cation, and a larger rate of sacrifice bits decreases the
generation rate of the final key. Hence, it is required to
derive the formula to calculate the upper bound of Eve’s
information for the final key for a given length of the
code and a given rate of sacrifice bits, under the realiz-
able quantum communication channel.
Our problems can be divided into three categories: The
first is the evaluation of Eve’s information for the given
length of our code and the given rate of sacrifice bits.
Since any implemented QKD system has a finite-length
code, any asymptotic security theory cannot guarantee
the security of an implemented QKD system. The second
is the security analysis for imperfect resource (e.g., phase-
randomized coherent light) that consists of mixtures of
the vacuum state, single-photon state, and multi-photon
state. Many practical QKD systems are equipped not
with single-photon but with weak phase-randomized co-
herent signals. These systems require a security analysis
with an imperfect resource. Further, even if a QKD sys-
tem is approximately equipped with single-photon sig-
nals, it nonetheless needs a security analysis for an im-
perfect resource because only a perfect single-photon re-
source allows the security analysis for the single-photon
case. The third is the identification of the relative ratio
among the vacuum state, the single-photon state, and
the multi-photon state in the detected pulses. Many im-
plemented quantum communication channels are so lossy
that Alice and Bob cannot identify this ratio in the de-
tected pulses even though they know this ratio in the
transmitted pulses. Thus, they need a method to esti-
mate this ratio. Each of these three problems has been
solved only separately, however, an implemented QKD
system requires a unified solution for these three prob-
2lems, which cannot be obtained by a simple combination
of separate solutions.
Concerning the first problem, many papers treated
only the asymptotic key generation (AKG) rate.
Only the papers, Mayers[2], Inamori-Lu¨tkenhaus-
Mayers(ILM)[7], S.Watanabe-R.Matsumoto-
Uyematsu(WMU)[8], Renner-Gisin-Kraus(RGK)[9], and
Hayashi[10] discussed the security of the finite-length
code with a low complexity protocol. In particular,
only ILM[7] takes into account the second problem
among them, and the other papers treat only the single
photon case. Extending the method of Mayers[2], ILM
[7] provided an evaluation of the security with imperfect
resources for the finite-length code. Unfortunately, their
formula for the security evaluation is so complicated that
a simpler security bound is needed. They also obtained
the AKG rate with imperfect resources. Extending the
method of Shor-Preskill[11], Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-
Preskill (GLLP)[12] also obtained this rate. In order to
solve the third problem, Hwang[3] developed the decoy
method, in which we estimate the ratio by changing the
intensity of the transmitted phase-randomized coherent
light randomly. After this breakthrough, applying the
asymptotic formula by GLLP[12], Wang[6] and Lo et
al.[4, 5] analyzed this method deeply, but did not treat
the security of the finite-length code. Hence, there is
not enough results to treat the security with the decoy
method for the finite-length code.
Further, there is a possibility for an improvement of
the AKG rate by ILM [7] and GLLP[12]. Taking into
account the effect of the vacuum state, Lo[13] conjec-
tured an improved AKG rate. Considering the effect of
the dark counts in the detector, Boileau-Batuwantudawe-
Laflamme (BBL)[14] conjectured a further improvement
of the AKG rate conjectured by Lo[13]. They pointed
out that the AKG rate with the forward error correction
is different from that with the reverse error correction.
In this paper, in order to evaluate eavesdropper’s per-
formances, we focus on the average of Eve’s information,
the average of the maximum of trace norm between Eve’s
states corresponding to different final keys, and the prob-
ability that Eve can correctly detect the final key. We
derive useful upper bounds of these quantities for the
protocol given in section II in the finite-length code by
use of mixing different imperfect resources. Based on
this bound, we obtain an AKG rate. In particular, due
to the consideration of the effect of the dark counts, our
bound improves that by ILM [7], and it yields the AKG
rate that coincides with the that conjectured by BBL[14].
We should mention here that our description for quan-
tum communication channel is given as a TP-CP map on
the two-mode bosonic system. Since our results can be
applied to the general imperfect sources, it provides secu-
rity with an approximate single-photon source. However,
further statistical analysis is required for the numerical
bound of Eve’s information for implemented QKD sys-
tem with the finite-length code. Such an analysis is pre-
sented in another paper [15]. Also, the analysis of the
AKG rate in the case of phase-randomized coherent light
will be presented in another paper [16].
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, as a
modification of BB84 protocol, we present our protocol,
in which we clarify the measuring data deciding the size
of sacrifice bits in the privacy amplification. In section
III, we derive upper bounds of the averages of Eve’s in-
formation about the final key and of the trace norm of
the maximum between Eve’s states corresponding to dif-
ferent final keys under the protocol given in section II. In
section IV, we characterize the AKG rate based on our
bounds, and apply it to the case of mixture of the vac-
uum and the single-photon and the case of approximate
single-photon. In Section V, the quantum communica-
tion channel is treated as a general TP-CP map on the
two-mode bosonic system. It is proved that such a gen-
eral case can be reduced to the case given in section III.
II. MODIFIED BB84 PROTOCOL WITH
DECOY STATE
We consider BB84 protocol based on + basis, | ↑〉, | ↓〉
and × basis, |+〉 := 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉), |−〉 := 1√
2
(| ↑〉−| ↓〉).
If we realize this protocol by using photon (or bosonic
particle), we have to generate single-photon in the two-
mode system and transmit it without no loss. How-
ever, it is impossible to implement this protocol per-
fectly, any realized quantum communication system can
send only an imperfect photon (or approximately single-
photon). Hence, we have to treat bosonic system more
carefully. Let us give its mathematical description. Two-
mode bosonic system is described by H := ⊕∞n=0Hn,
where the n-photon system Hn is the Hilbert space
spanned by |0, n〉, |1, n − 1〉, . . . , |n − 1, 1〉, and |n, 0〉.
For example, |j, n − j〉 is the state consisting of j pho-
tons with the state | ↑〉 and n − j photons with the
state | ↓〉. Also the vector ∑nj=0√(nj)(12 )n|j, n − j〉
(
∑n
j=0
√(
n
j
)
(12 )
n(−1)n−j |j, n − j〉) corresponds to the
state of n photons with the state |+〉 (|−〉). That is, the
system Hn is equivalent with the n-th symmetric sub-
space of two dimensional system. We also denote the
state of j photons with the state |+〉 and n− j photons
with the state |−〉 by |j, n− j,×〉.
When we would generate the state | ↑〉 in the two-
dimensional system with the coherent pulse, the gener-
ated state is described by the state
∑∞
n=0 e
− |α|22 αn√
n!
|n, 0〉
in the two-mode bosonic system. However, if we
implement our system so that each phase factor
θ of the complex amplitude α =
√
µeiθ is com-
pletely random, our state can be regarded as the
mixed state e−µ
∑∞
n=0
µn
n! |n, 0〉〈n, 0|, which depends
only on the intensity µ. In the following, we
consider a more general case, in which the pulse
sent by the sender (Alice) are given by ρν0,+ :=∑∞
n=0 ν(n)|n, 0〉〈n, 0|, ρν1,+ :=
∑∞
n=0 ν(n)|0, n〉〈0, 0|,
3ρν0,× :=
∑∞
n=0 ν(n)|n, 0,×〉〈n, 0,×|, ρν1,× :=∑∞
n=0 ν(n)|0, n,×〉〈0, n,×|, where ν is an arbitrary
distribution.
Since our communication channel is lossy, the receiver
(Bob) cannot necessarily detect all of the sent pulses. If
the breakdown of the detected pulses (the ratio among
the vacuum state, the single-photon state, n-photon
state, and so on) is known, we can guarantee the security
of BB84 protocol based on the discussion on subsection
III B. However, since the usual quantum communication
channel is lossy, there is a possibility that Eve can control
the loss depending on the number of the photons. Hence,
it is impossible to identify the the loss of each number of
the photons if Alice sends the pulse by using one distri-
bution ν. One solution is the decoy method[3, 4, 6], in
which Alice randomly chooses the distribution ν and esti-
mates the loss and the error probabilities of each number
state. It is effective to choose the vacuum pulse |0〉〈0|.
In the following, we describe our protocol. First, we fix
the following; the size N of our code, the maximum num-
ber N and the minimum number N of final key size, the
number N ′ of sent pulses, the k distributions ν1, . . . , νk
of the generated number of photons, and the distribution
νi0 , whose pulse generates the raw keys. Since the vac-
uum pulse and two bases are available, Alice sends 2k+1
kinds of pulses, where the 0-th kind of pulse means the
vacuum pulse, the i-th kind of pulse means the pulse
with the × basis generated by the distribution νi, and
the i+k-th kind of pulse means the pulse with the + ba-
sis generated by the distribution νi for i = 1, . . . , k. For
this purpose, they fix the probabilities p0, . . . , p2k, and
Alice generates i-th kind of pulse with the probability pi
for i = 0, . . . , 2k. The probabilities pi0 and pk+i0 should
be larger because these generate the pulses producing
the raw keys. In this paper, we use the bold style for
describing the vector concerning the index i representing
the kind of pulse, as p = (p0, . . . , p2k).
Before the quantum communication, they check the
probability pD of dark counts in the detector, and the
probability pS of errors of the × basis occurred in the
detector or the generator, which can be measured by
the error probability when the quantum communication
channel has no error. Similarly, they the probability p˜S
of errors of the + basis occurred in the detector or the
generator.
1. Alice sends the N ′ pulses, where each pulse is
chosen among 2k + 1 kinds of pulses. She de-
notes the number of the i-th kind of pulses by Ai.
(
∑2k+1
i=0 Ai = N
′)
2. After sending N ′ pulses, Alice announces the kind
of the each pulse (the basis and the distribution νi)
by using public channel.
3. Bob records the numbers C0, . . . , C2k of detected
pulses and the numbers E1, . . . , E2k of detected
pulses with the common basis for each kind i =
0, . . . , 2k of pulses. Bob announces the positions of
pulses with the common basis and the above num-
bers by using public channel.
4. Alice chooses Ei0 −N bits among i0-th pulses with
the common basis and Ei0+k − N bits among the
i0 + k-th pulses with the common basis, and an-
nounces these positions and their bit by using pub-
lic channel. Bob records the number of errors as
Hi0 , Hi0+k and announces them by using public
channel. If Ei0 ≤ N or Ei0+k ≤ N , they stop their
protocol and return to the first step.
5. Alice and Bob announce their bit of the remain-
ing kinds i 6= 0, i0, i0 + k of pulses, and record the
number of error by Hi.
6. Using these informations, they decide the rates
η(
Hi0+k
Ei0+k−N ) and η(
Hi0
Ei0−N ) of error correction and
the sizes of sacrifice bits m(Di,De) and m˜(D˜i,De)
in the privacy amplification for the remaining
the i0-th kind of pulses and and the i0 + k-th
kind of pulses, respectively, where we abbreviate
the initial data (A, ν , pS , pD) and (A, ν , p˜S , pD)
and the experimental data (C,E,H) to Di, D˜i,
and De. If Nη( Hi0+kEi0+k−N ) − m(Di,De) < N or
Nη(
Hi0
Ei0−N ) − m˜(D˜i,De) < N , they stop their
protocol and return to the first step. Further,
if N < Nη(
Hi0+k
Ei0+k−N ) − m(Di,De), they replace
m(Di,De) by Nη( Hi0+kEi0+k−N )−N . Similarly, if N <
Nη(
Hi0
Ei0−N ) − m˜(D˜i,De), they replace m˜(D˜i,De).
by Nη(
Hi0
Ei0−N )−N .
7. They perform N bits error correction for + basis,
and generate Nη(
Hi0+k
Ei0+k−N ) bits.
8. They perform privacy amplification for the + basis,
and generate Nη(
Hi0+k
Ei0+k−N )−m(Di,De) bits.
9. They perform N bits error correction for the × ba-
sis, and generate Nη(
Hi0
Ei0−N ) bits.
10. They perform privacy amplification for the × basis,
and generate Nη(
Hi0
Ei0−N )− m˜(D˜i,De) bits.
If Bob detects both events |0〉 and |1〉 in the measurement
of the + basis, he decides one event with the probability
1
2 . In the following, this measurement is described by the
POVM {M∅,M0,M1}.
Error correction (7., 9.) In the step 7. and 9., Alice
and Bob generate l +m bits with negligible errors
from N bits X and X ′ by using one of the following
protocols: (For example, l and m are choosen as
l +m = Nη(
Hi0+k
Ei0+k−N ) and m = m(Di,De).)
4Forward error correction They share N × (l +
m) binary matrix Me. Alice generates other
l+m bits random number Z, and sendsMeZ+
X to Bob. Bob applies the decoding of the
code Me to the bits MeZ +X −X ′ to extract
Z, and obtain Z ′.
Reverse error correction Bob generates other
l + m bits random number Z, and sends
MeZ+
′X to Alice. Alice applies the decoding
of the code Me to the bits MeZ +X
′ −X to
extract Z, and obtain Z ′.
As mentioned later, since this error correction cor-
responds to a part of the twirling operation, their
channel can be regarded as a Pauli channel from Al-
ice to Bob in the forward case (from Bob to Alice
in the reverse case).
Privacy amplification (8., 10.) In the step 8. and
10., Alice and Bob generate l bits from l +m bits
Z by using the following protocol. First, they gen-
erate the same l × (l +m) binary matrix Mp with
the following condition:
P{Z ∈ ImMTp } ≤ 2−m (1)
for any non-zero l +m bit sequence Z. Next, they
generate l bits MpZ from l +m bits Z.
Hence, combining the above error correction and the
above privacy amplification, Alice can be regarded to
send information by the code ImMe/Me(KerMp).
The preceding researches[2, 7, 8] analyze the security
when the binary matrix Mp for privacy amplification is
chosen completely randomly. If we choose the binary
matrix Mp by the Toeplitz matrix[17, 18], we need less
random number. This is because Toeplitz matrix requires
only l + m − 1 bits random number while completely
random binary matrix Mp does (l + m)l bits random
number. An l × (l + m) binary matrix (X, I) is called
Toeplitz matrix[17, 18] when its element X = (Xi,j) is
given by l +m− 1 random variables Y1, . . . , Yl+m−1 as
Xi,j := Yi+j−1.
Theorem 1 Toeplitz matrix satisfies the condition (1)
for any element Z 6= 0 ∈ Fl+m2 .
For a proof, see Appendix A.
III. EVALUATION OF EVE’S INFORMATION
CONCERNING FINAL KEY
A. Formulation of channel
In this section, we assume a simplified Eve’s attack,
and evaluate the security against Eve’s attack. In Section
V, we will treat the general case of Eve’s attack, and
prove that the general case can be reduced to the case of
this section.
First, we assume that Eve can distinguish the four
states |n, 0〉, and |0, n〉 in + basis and |n, 0,×〉,|0, n,×〉
in × basis. Hence, the input system can be described
by N -th tensor product system H⊗N of H := H0 ⊕
H1 ⊕ (⊕n≥2Hn,+) ⊕ (⊕n≥2Hn,×), where H0 is the one-
dimensional space spanned by |0, 0〉, H1 is the two-
dimensional space spanned by |0, 1〉 and |1, 0〉,Hn,+ is the
two-dimensional space spanned by |n, 0〉, and |0, n〉, and
Hn,× is the two-dimensional space spanned by |n, 0,×〉
and |0, n,×〉. The output system is described by N -th
tensor product space H⊗N of H0 ⊕H1.
Then, the quantum communication channel from Alice
to Bob is given by
⊕
~n
∑
~e
P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1Eei|ni)(ρ), (2)
where P~n(~e) is the distribution of ~e when ~n is fixed. Such
a channel is called Pauli channel. Here, ~n and ~e are
given as follows: Each element ni of ~n = (n1, . . . , nN )
is chosen among 0, 1, (2,+), (2,×), . . .. Each element ei
of ~e = (e1, . . . , eN) is chosen as v or s when ni is 0. It
is chosen among v, (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) when ni is 1.
Otherwise, it is chosen among v, 0, 1. When ni is 0 or 1,
the channel Eei|ni is defined as
Eei|0(ρ) :=
{ 〈0, 0|ρ|0, 0〉|0, 0〉〈0, 0| if ei = v
〈0, 0|ρ|0, 0〉ρmix,1 if ei = s
Eei|1(ρ) :=
{ |0, 0〉〈0, 0|TrPH1ρPH1 if ei = v
W
eiPH1ρPH1(Wei)† otherwise,
where
ρmix,1 :=
1
2
(|0, 1〉〈0, 1|+ |1, 0〉〈1, 0|),
W
(x,z) := XxZz,
X|0, 1〉 = |1, 0〉, X|1, 0〉 = |0, 1〉,
Z|0, 1〉 = −|0, 1〉, Z|1, 0〉 = |1, 0〉.
When ni is not 0 or 1, the channel Eei|ni is defined as
5Eei|ni(ρ) :=


|0, 0〉〈0, 0|TrρPHni if ei = v〈0, ni|ρ|0, ni〉|0, ni〉〈0, ni|+ 〈1, ni|ρ|1, ni〉|1, ni〉〈1, ni| if ei = 0
〈0, ni|ρ|0, ni〉|1, ni〉〈1, ni|+ 〈1, ni|ρ|1, ni〉|0, ni〉〈0, ni| if ei = 1.
The raw key is generated from detected pulses, which
belong to the system H1 on the Bob’s side. Thus,
we focus only on the pulse whose measurement value
is not v. In the following, we consider the security
from the final key distilled from raw keys of the + ba-
sis. Hence, the generated state can be restricted to
H0 ⊕ H1 ⊕ (⊕n≥2Hn,+). Thus, it can be assumed that
our channel
⊕
~n
∑
~e P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1Eei|ni) satisfies that each
element ei of ~e = (e1, . . . , eN ) is not v.
B. Security of known channel: no dark count case
Assume that the input state belongs to the subsystem
H~n := Hn1⊗· · ·⊗HnN labeled by ~n = (n1, . . . , nN ). Now,
we classify the N input subsystems into three parts:
0th part: K0(~n) := #{i|ni = 0}.
1st part: K1(~n) := #{i|ni = 1}.
2nd part: K2(~n) := #{i|ni ≥ 2}.
In the 0-th part, Eve can obtain no information. That is,
Eve’s information is equal to Eve’s information when the
Alice’s information is sent by the + basis via the qubit
channel:
E ′s|0(ρ) :=
1
2
(X0ρ(X0)† + X1ρ(X1)†).
In the 2nd part, Eve can obtain all of Alice’s informa-
tion by the following method: Eve receives two-photon
state. She sends one qubit system to Bob, and keeps
the other qubit. After the announcement of the basis,
Eve measures her system with the correct basis. Thus,
Eve’s information is equal to Eve’s information when the
Alice’s information is sent by the + basis via the phase-
damping qubit channel (pinching channel):
E ′ei|(n,+)(ρ) :=
1
2
(Z0ρ(Z0)† + Z1ρ(Z1)†)
for n ≥ 2. This is because the channel is given by E ′ei|(n,+)
in the single photon case when Eve measures the sys-
tem with the correct basis. Here, the presence or the
absence of the error X is not so important for Eve’s in-
formation. This is because the probabilities concerning
the action Z is essential, as is discussed in Appendix C.
Therefore, Eve’s information concerning total N bits is
equal to Eve’s information when the N bits information
x1, . . . , xN is sent by |x1, . . . , xN 〉 ∈ (C2)⊗N via the fol-
lowing qubit channel:∑
~e
P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1E ′ei|ni). (3)
There is a relation between the error probability in the
× basis and the security.
Theorem 2 Define PP~n
ph|Mp as the error probability by
an arbitrary decoding when an information sent by the
code (Me(KerMp))
⊥/(ImMe)⊥ with the × basis via
the qubit channel
∑
~e P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1E ′ei|ni)(ρ), where ~n :=
(n1, . . . , nN). When Alice sends l bits information with
the code ImMe/Me(KerMp) in the + basis via the same
channel, the following relations hold.
Define ρE[Z]|Mp as the final Eve’s state when Alice’s in-
formation is [Z] = MpZ. Then, Eve’s information I
P~n
E|Mp
is given as the quantum mutual information:
IP~n
E|Mp :=
1
2l
∑
[Z]
D(ρE[Z]|Mp‖ρEMp)
D(ρ‖ρ′) := Tr ρ(log ρ− log ρ′)
ρEMp :=
∑
[Z]
1
2l
ρE[Z]|Mp .
The quantum mutual information IP~n
E|Mp satisfies that
IP~n
E|Mp ≤ h(P
P~n
ph|Mp) + lP
P~n
ph|Mp , (4)
where h(x) is defined as
h(x) :=
{ −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2
1 if 1/2 < x ≤ 1.
Hence, Eve’s information per one bit is evaluated as
IP~n
E|Mp
l
≤
h(PP~n
ph|Mp)
l
+ PP~n
ph|Mp . (5)
We also obtain the following:
min
[Z] 6=[Z′]
F (ρE[Z]|Mp , ρ
E
[Z′]|Mp) ≥ 1− 2PP~nph|Mp (6)
max
[Z] 6=[Z′]
‖ρE[Z]|Mp − ρE[Z′]|Mp‖1 ≤ 4PP~nph|Mp . (7)
min
[Z]
F (ρE[Z]|Mp , ρ
E
Mp
) ≥ 1− PP~n
ph|Mp (8)
max
[Z]
‖ρE[Z]|Mp − ρEMp‖1 ≤ 2PP~nph|Mp , (9)
6where F (ρ, ρ′) := Tr
√√
ρ′ρ
√
ρ′. Define PP~n
succ|Mp as the
probability of successfully detecting the Alice’s informa-
tion [Z]. Then, the inequality
PP~n
succ|Mp ≤
(√
PP~n
ph|Mp
√
1− 2−l +
√
1− PP~n
ph|Mp
√
2−l
)2
(10)
holds.
Further, the concavity of h implies that
EP~nMpI
P~n
E|Mp ≤ h(E
P~n
Mp
PP~n
ph|Mp) + lE
P~n
Mp
PP~n
ph|Mp (11)
EP~nMp
IP~n
E|Mp
l
≤
h(EP~nMpP
P~n
ph|Mp)
l
+ EP~nMpP
P~n
ph|Mp . (12)
The concavity of left hand side of (10) holds concerning
PP~n
ph|Mp . Thus,
EP~nMpP
P~n
succ|Mp
≤
(√
EP~nMpP
P~n
ph|Mp
√
1− 2−l +
√
1− EP~nMpPP~nph|Mp
√
2−l
)2
.
For a proof, see Appendix C. As shown in Sec-
tion V, sending l bits information with the code
ImMe/Me(KerMp) is equivalent with the combination
of sending random number and forward error correction
by ImMe and privacy amplification by Me(KerMp).
Next, we focus on the average error probability
PP~n
ph,min|Mp with the minimum length decoding when an
information sent by the code (Me(KerMp))
⊥/(ImMe)⊥
with the × basis via the qubit channel Λ(ρ) =∑
~e P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1E ′ei|ni)(ρ). This value is described as
PP~n
ph,min|Mp =
1
|(ImMe)⊥|
∑
z∈(ImMe)⊥
∑
z′:(13)
〈z′|P~n(|z〉〈z|)|z′〉,
where we take the summand concerning z′ satisfying the
following condition (13):
argmin
z′′∈(Me(KerMp))⊥
dis(z′, z′′) ∈ (ImMe)⊥, (13)
and dis(z′, z′′) is the Hamming distance between z′ and
z′′. In order to analyze the error probability PP~n
ph,min|Mp ,
we introduce the number t(~e, ~n):
t(~e, ~n) := #{i|ni = 1, ei = (0, 1) or (1, 1)}.
Theorem 3 Assume that the binary matrix Mp satisfies
the condition (1). If the distribution P~n takes positive
probabilities only in the set {~e|t(~e, ~n) = t}, then we obtain
EMpP
P~n
ph,min|Mp ≤ 2
K1(~n)h( t
K1(~n)
)+K2(~n)−m
.
Further, if the stochastic behavior of the random vari-
able t = t(~e, ~n) on the distribution P~n is described by the
distribution p( t
K1(~n) ), then the inequality
EMpP
P~n
ph,min|Mp
≤
K1(~n)∑
t=0
p(
t
K1(~n)
)min
{
2
K1(~n)h( k
K1(~n)
)+K2(~n)−m
, 1
}
holds. That is, the upper bound can be characterized by
~K(~n) and t.
For a proof, see Appendix D.
C. Security of known channel: dark count case
Next, we take into account the effect of dark
count in the detector. In this case, in order to
characterize the presence or the absence of dark
count, we add c or d to the label ni of the in-
put system. That is, the label ni is chosen among
(0, c), (0, d), (1, c), (1, d), (2,+, c), (2,+, d), (2,×, c), (2,×, d), . . .
etc, where (∗, d) expresses dark count and (∗, c) does the
normal count. Then, we can classify detected pulses to
the following six parts:
o = 0, J0(~n): The number of detected pulses except for
dark count whose initial (Alice’s) state is the vac-
uum state.
o = 1, J1(~n): The number of detected pulses except for
dark count whose initial (Alice’s) state is the single-
photon state.
o = 2, J2(~n): The number of detected pulses except for
dark count whose initial (Alice’s) state is the multi-
photon state.
o = 3, J3(~n): The number of pulses detected by dark
count whose initial (Alice’s) state is the vacuum
state.
o = 4, J4(~n): The number of pulses detected by dark
count whose initial (Alice’s) state is the single-
photon state.
o = 5, J5(~n): The number of detected pulses except for
dark count whose initial (Alice’s) state is the multi-
photon state.
Now, we consider the following protocol: First, Al-
ice sends the random number with the + basis via∑
~e P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1Eei|ni)(ρ), where for the dark counts ni =
(∗, d), ei takes only d and the map Ed|ni is given by
Ed|ni(ρ) = 12 (|0, 1〉〈0, 1| + |1, 0〉〈1, 0|). Second, they ap-
ply the forward or reverse error correction by the code
ImMe, and finally perform privacy amplification by Mp,
where Mp is assumed to satisfy (1). In this case, we ob-
tain the same argument as Theorem 2. Thus, in order to
discuss the security, we need to characterize the average
error probability in the × basis.
7Now, we consider the forward error correction case. In
the event o = 0, 3, Eve cannot obtain any information
of Alice’s raw key. Also, in the event o = 2, 4, 5, Eve
can obtain all information of Alice’s raw key. Thus, our
situation is the same as the case of K1 = J1 and K2 =
J2+ J4+ J5 of Theorem 3. Similar to the above subsec-
tion, we define the average error probability PP~n
ph,min,→|Mp
of the code (Me(KerMp))
⊥/(ImMe)⊥ concerning the ×
basis with the channel
∑
~e P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1E ′ei|ni)(ρ), where
we define the map E ′ei|ni for dark count ni = (∗, d) as
follows: E ′d|(∗,d) is the same as Ed|∗ and
E ′d|(0,d)(ρ) :=
1
2
(X0ρ(X0)† + X1ρ(X1)†),
E ′d|(∗,d)(ρ) :=
1
2
(Z0ρ(Z0)† + Z1ρ(Z1)†)
for ∗ 6= 0. The distribution p( t
J1(~n) ) is defined as the
distribution describing the random variable t = t(~e, ~n)
under the distribution P~n, and define t(~e, ~n) by
t(~e, ~n) := #{i|ni = (1, c), ei = (0, 1) or (1, 1)}.
Then, we obtain
EMpP
P~n
ph,min,→|Mp
≤
J1∑
t=0
p(
t
J1
)min
{
2J
1h( t
J1
)+J2+J4+J5−m, 1
}
. (14)
Next, we consider the reverse error correction case. We
assume that the bits detected by dark count cannot be
controlled by Eve. That is, in the event o = 3, 4, 5, Eve
cannot obtain any information of Bob’s raw key. Also,
in the event o = 0, 2, Eve can obtain all information
of Bob’s raw key. (In the case of o = 0, Eve can ob-
tain Bob’s information by the following. Eve generates
an entangled pair, and sends Bob a part of it. After
announcing the basis, Eve measures the remaining part
based on the correct basis.) Hence, our situation is the
same as the case of K1 = J1 and K2 = J0 + J2 of
Theorem 3. Similar to the above subsection, we define
the average error probability PP~n
ph,min,←|Mp of the code
(Me(KerMp))
⊥/(ImMe)⊥ concerning the × basis with
the channel
∑
~e P~n(~e)(⊗Ni=1E ′ei|ni), where we define the
map E ′ei|ni as follows:
E ′d|(·,d)(ρ) :=
1
2
(X0ρ(X0)† + X1ρ(X1)†),
E ′ei|(1,c)(ρ) := Weiρ(Wei )†,
E ′ei|(∗,c)(ρ) :=
1
2
(Z0ρ(Z0)† + Z1ρ(Z1)†)
for ∗ 6= 1.
Note that the definition of E ′ei|ni for dark count ni =
(∗, d) is different from the forward case. Here x =←
expresses the reverse case. Then, we obtain
EMpP
P~n
ph,min,←|Mp
≤
J1∑
t=0
p(
t
J1
)min
{
2J
1h( t
J1
)+J0+J2−m, 1
}
. (15)
D. Security of unknown channel: dark count case
Now, we back to the original setting. Since the num-
bers J0, . . . , J5 and the ratio r1 := t
J1
are unknown, the
size of sacrifice bits is chosen as the function m(Di,De)
of the random variable De. For simplicity, we abbreviate
m(Di,De) and η( Hi0+kEi0+k−N ) to m and η.
Now, we give general security formulas for the given
function m of De. The random variable ~n is known by
Eve, but cannot be decided by Eve. Hence, Eve’s in-
formation is measured by the conditional expectations
IPE|Mp,De,POS of I
P~n
E|Mp concerning the random variable ~n
when the random variables Mp,De, and POS are fixed,
where POS is the random variable describing the posi-
tion of the check bits and each kinds of pulses. We de-
fine PPph,min,x|Mp,De,POS as the conditional expectations
of PP~n
ph,min,x|Mp, ~J concerning ~n when the random vari-
ables De, and POS are fixed. Then, we obtain
EPMp,De,POSI
P
E|Mp,De,POS
≤EPDe,POSh(PPph,min,x|De,POS)
+ EPDe,POS(Nη −m)PPph,min,x|De,POS
≤PPph,av,x(N + 1− logPPph,av,x), (16)
where EPMp,De,POS (E
P
De,POS) denotes the expectation
concerning the random variables Mp,De, and POS, (De,
and POS). The inequality (16) is proved in Appendix E.
Hence, Eve’s information per one bit can be evaluated as
EPDe,POS
IPE|De,POS
Nη −m ≤E
P
De,POS
h(PPph|De,POS)
Nη −m + P
P
ph,av,x
≤h(P
P
ph,av,x)
N
+ PPph,av,x.
Similarly, Eve’s state can be given as the conditional av-
erage Eve’s state ρE[Z]|Mp,De,POS with the final key [Z]
when the random variables Mp,De, and POS are fixed.
8Then,
EPMp,De,POS min[Z] 6=[Z′]
F (ρE[Z], ρ
E
[Z′]|Mp,De,POS)
≥1− 2PPph,av,x
EPMp,De,POS max[Z] 6=[Z′]
‖ρE[Z]|Mp,De,POS − ρE[Z′]|Mp,De,POS‖1
≤4PPph,av,x
EPMp,De,POSmin[Z]
F (ρE[Z]|Mp,De,POS, ρ
E
Mp,De,POS)
≥1− PPph,av,x
EPMp,De,POSmax[Z]
‖ρE[Z]|Mp,De,POS − ρEMp,De,POS‖1
≤2PPph,av,x,
where ρEMp,De,POS is the average state of ρ
E
[Z]|Mp,De,POS
concerning [Z], and PPph,av,x := E
P
De,POSP
P
ph|De,POS. We
can evaluate the probability PPsucc,x|Mp,De,POS that Eve
successfully detects the final key [Z]:
EPMp,De,POSP
P
succ,x|Mp
≤EPMp,De,POS
(√
PP
ph,min,x|Mp,De,POS
√
1− 2−(ηN−m)
+
√
1− PP
ph,min,x|Mp,De,POS
√
2−(ηN−m)
)2
(17)
≤
(√
PPph,av,x
√
1− 2−N +
√
1− PPph,av,x
√
2−N
)2
,
(18)
where (18) follows from the concavity of left hand side of
(10).
In order to guarantee the security, it is sufficient to
show that the probability PPph,av,x is quite small for any
P . Since the quantity PPph,av,x has the linear form con-
cerning P , it is enough to treat PPph,av,x when P is an
extremal point. That is, the relation
max
P: any conditional distribution
PPph,av,x
= max
P∈EP
PPph,av,x
holds, where EP is the set of extremal points concerning
the set of conditional distributions. From (14) and (15),
these values are evaluated as follows.
max
P∈EP
PPph,av,→
≤ max
P∈EP
EP~J,t,De,POSmin
{
2J
1h( t
J1
)+J2+J4+J5−m, 1
}
(19)
max
P∈EP
PPph,av,←
≤ max
P∈EP
EP~J,t,De,POSmin
{
2J
1h( t
J1
)+J0+J2−m, 1
}
. (20)
where t is the number of errors of the × basis in the
event of o = 1. Here, we have to treat the conditional
expectation concerning ~J and t even if the other random
variable De is fixed. Hence, our purpose is choosing the
size m of sacrifice bits based on the information Di and
De.
Since Alice chooses the positions of each kinds of pulses
and check bits randomly, as is discussed in Hayashi et al.
[15], the stochastic behavior of De is given by hypergeo-
metric distribution in the case of any extremal point P .
In order to guarantee the security with the finite-length
code, we have to calculate (19) and (20) for the specific
function m(Di,De). Since this task needs a large amount
of calculation due to a large number of random variables,
we treat it in another paper [15].
In the beginning of this sec-
tion, we assume that the states
{|n, 0〉〈n, 0|, |0, n〉〈0, n|, |n, 0,×〉〈n, 0,×|, |0, n,×〉〈0, n,×|}n≥2
can be distinguished by Eve. Now, instead of
the above states, we focus on the other set
of states {ρ↑,+i :=
∑
n s
i
n|n, 0〉〈n, 0|, ρ↓,+i :=∑
n s
i
n|0, n〉〈0, n|, ρ↑,×i :=
∑
n s
i
n|n, 0,×〉〈n, 0,×|, ρ↓,×i :=∑
n s
i
n|0, n,×〉〈0, n,×|}n≥2 which can describe all sent
pulses by the convex combination of theirselves with the
states |0, 0〉〈0, 0|, |1, 0〉〈1, 0|, |0, 1〉〈0, 1|, |1, 0,×〉〈1, 0,×|,
|0, 1,×〉〈0, 1,×|. Then, we can assume so stronger
ability of Eve that Eve can distinguish all states of
{ρ↑,+i , ρ↓,+i , ρ↑,×i , ρ↓,×i }n≥2. In this case, we obtain the
same argument as this section with replacing the former
set by the latter set. The construction of sin in the
case of the phase-randomized coherent light is given in
Hayashi [16].
E. Security with two-way error correction
Here, we should remark that the effects of dark counts
and the vacuum states are helpful only when the error
correction is one-way. If we apply a careless two-way
error correction, these effects are not so helpful. That
is, Eve has a possibility to access the information in the
events o = 0, 2, 3, 4, 5. The main point of the two-way er-
ror correction is the following: Consider the case where
a reverse error correction is applied after a forward er-
ror correction. In this case, the second error correction
depends on (a prat of) Bob’s syndrome. That is, he has
to announce (a part of) his syndrome. Now, consider
an extremal case, i.e., the case where Bob announces all
of his syndrome. This case is equivalent with the case
where Bob announces his syndrome after Alice transmits
her information via a Pauli channel with the + basis.
In the single-photon case, as is discussed in Appendix
B, Eve’s information contains all information concerning
the flip action X on the + basis, which includes Bob’s syn-
drome. Hence, this information it is useless for Eve in the
single-photon case. However, it allows Eve to access the
information in the events o = 0, 2, 4, 5 in the imperfect
photon case. Eve knows the parts o = 2, 4, 5 concerning
Alice’s bits Z after the forward error correction by the
code C ⊂ FN2 . She also knows the parts o = 0, 2 con-
9cerning Bob’s bits Z ′ after the forward error correction
by the code C using Bob’s syndrome. The channels in
other parts o = 1, 3 can be regarded as the single-photon
case with the channels:
E ′ei|(1,c)(ρ) = Weiρ(Wei )†
E ′d|(0,d)(ρ) =
1
2
(Z0ρ(Z0)† + Z1ρ(Z1)†).
Suppose that Bob can perfectly correct the error, i.e.,
his bits Z ′ is equal to hers Z. Eve knows the parts o =
0, 2, 4, 5 concerning Z. Now, we focus on the subcode
C′ ⊂ FJ1+J32 defined by
C′ = {x ∈ FJ1+J32 |(x,~0N−(J1+J3)) ∈ C},
where ~0N−(J1+J3) is the 0 vector in the composite sys-
tem of the parts o = 0, 2, 4, 5. Then, Eve’s state is
equal to that in the case where Alice sends her infor-
mation with the code C′ via the J1 + J3-qubits chan-
nel
∑
ei
P~n(~e) ⊗i:ni=(1,c),(0,d) E ′ei|ni . Therefore, our sit-
uation is the same as the case of K1 = J1 and K2 =
J0 + J2 + J4 + J5 of Theorem 3.
Now, we proceed to the general case of two-way error
correction, in which the final classical error correction
code Cu is chosen with the probability p(u), i.e., Alice
decides the i-th code Ci depending on the i−1 syndromes
of Bob, inductively. We define the average error proba-
bility PP~n
ph,min,↔|Mp,u and the distribution pu(
t
J1
) con-
cerning the random variable t
J1
when the classical error
correction code Cu is chosen, where t is defined similar
to subsection III B. The relation∑
u
p(u)pu(
t
J1
) = p(
t
J1
) (21)
holds. Applying Theorem 3 in the case of K1 = J1 and
K2 = J0 + J2 + J4 + J5, we obtain
EMpP
P~n
ph,min,↔|Mp,u
≤
J1∑
t=0
pu(
t
J1
)min
{
2J
1h( t
J1
)+J0+J2+J4+J5−m, 1
}
. (22)
Thus, from (21) and (22), the average error probability
PP~n
ph,min,↔|Mp satisfies that
EMpP
P~n
ph,min,↔|Mp
≤
J1∑
t=0
p(
t
J1
)min
{
2J
1h( t
J1
)+J0+J2+J4+J5−m, 1
}
. (23)
Thus, we can derive the same argument as subsection
IIID. Here, the choice of the sacrifice bit size m depends
only on the data Di and De. If we choose the sacrifice
bit size m using information u, there is a possibility to
improve the above evaluation.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC KEY GENERATION RATE
A. Asymptotic key generation rate with dark
count effect
From the discussion of the precious section, if we
choose the number of sacrifice bits m as a larger num-
ber than J1h(r1) + J2 + J4 + J5 in the forward case,
our final key is asymptotically secure. Hence, we call
J1h(r1) + J2 + J4 + J5 = N − J1(1− h(r1))− (J0 + J3)
the initial Eve’s information in the forward case. Also,
J1h(r1) + J0 + J2 = N − J1(1− h(r1))− (J3 + J4 + J5)
is called the initial Eve’s information in the reverse case.
Thus, the asymptotic key generation (AKG) rates for the
detected pulses of the forward and reverse cases are equal
to
J1(1− h(r1)) + J0 + J3
N
− (1− η(sν,+)) (24)
J1(1− h(r1)) + J3 + J4 + J5
N
− (1− η(sν,+)), (25)
respectively, when η(sν,+) is the coding rate of the clas-
sical error correction code, where N :=
∑5
i=0 Ji and sν,+
is the average error probability of the detected pulses.
In the asymptotic case, J
3+J4+J5
N
and J
0+J3
N
converge
to pD and ν(0)p0 in probability, respectively, where p0 is
the counting rate of the vacuum pulse and pD is the rate
of the dark counts among sent pulses. Thus, when our
pulse is generated by the distribution ν, the initial Eve’s
informations in the forward and reverse cases are equal
to
N(1− ν(1)q
1(1− h(r1))
pν,+
− ν(0)p0
pν,+
) (26)
N(1− ν(1)q
1(1− h(r1))
pν,+
− pD
pν,+
), (27)
respectively, where pν,+ is the counting rate of the pulse
with the + basis generated by the distribution ν, q1 is
the counting rate of the single-photon states except for
dark counts, and r1 is the error rate of the × basis among
the single-photon states detected except for dark counts.
Hence, two important rates q1 and r1 are needed to be
estimated.
By taking into account the counting rate pν,+, the
AKG rates for the sent pulses of the forward and reverse
cases are equal to
I→ :=
ν(1)q1(1 − h(r1)) + ν(0)p0 − pν,+(1− η(sν,+))
2
(28)
I← :=
ν(1)q1(1 − h(r1)) + pD − pν,+(1 − η(sν,+))
2
, (29)
respectively, where sν,+ is the error rate of pulses gener-
ated with the distribution ν in the + basis. These rates
are equal to those conjectured by BBL[14]. Hence, the
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difference between ν(0)p02 and
pD
2 gives those of the for-
ward and reverse cases.
By applying GLLP[12]-ILM[7] formulas, the AKG rate
is equal to
IGLLP−ILM :=
1
2
(
ν(1)q1(1− h(r1))− pν,+(1 − η(sν,+))
)
,
where q1 is the rate of all detected single-photon states
(containing states detected by dark counts), and r1 is the
error rate among all detected single-photon states in the
× basis [4]. These are calculated as
q1 = q1 + pD
r1 =
r1q1 + 12pD
q1 + pD
.
If we do not take into account the effect of dark counts,
the AKG rates of the forward and reverse cases are cal-
culated to
I→ :=
ν(1)q1(1 − h(r1)) + ν(0)p0 − pν,+(1− η(sν,+))
2
I← :=
ν(1)q1(1 − h(r1))− pν,+(1− η(sν,+))
2
,
respectively. The AKG rate I→ was conjectured by Lo
[13], and proved by Koashi [19] independently.
The discussion in subsection III E implies that the
AKG rate
I↔ :=
ν(1)q1(1− h(r1)) + ν(0)pD − pν,+(1− η(sν,+))
2
can be attained by two-way error correction[21]. Assum-
ing that the coding rate of two-way error correction is
equal to that of one-way error correction, we compare
these AKG rates. Since ν(1)q1(1 − h(r1)) + ν(0)pD ≥
ν(1)q1(1−h(r1)) = ν(1)(q1(1−h(r1))+pD(1−h(12 ))) ≥
ν(1)(q1 + pD)(1 − h( r
1q1+ 12pD
q1+pD
)) = ν(1)q1(1 − h(r1)), we
have
I→ ≥ I→ ≥ IGLLP−ILM
I← ≥ I↔ ≥ I← ≥ IGLLP−ILM
I→ ≥ I↔.
B. Mixture of the vacuum state and the
single-photon state
First, we assume that pS = 0. Now, we consider the
distribution ν taking probabilities only in the vacuum
state and the single-photon state. Then, q1 and the er-
ror rate r1 = r1× of the × basis can be solved from the
counting rate p0 of the vacuum states, the counting rate
pν,× of the pulses generated by ν in the × basis, and the
error rate sν,× of the same pulses as follows. Since q1
and r1× satisfy the equations:
pν,× = ν(0)p0 + ν(1)(pD + q1)
sν,×pν,× =
1
2
ν(0)p0 + ν(1)(
1
2
pD + r
1
×q
1),
we obtain
q1 =
pν,× − ν(0)p0
ν(1)
− pD
r1× =
sν,×pν,× − 12ν(0)p0 − 12ν(1)pD
pν,× − ν(0)p0 − ν(1)pD .
Note that the counting rate pν,+ of the pulses generated
by ν in the + basis coincides with the counting rate pν,×
of the pulses generated by ν in the × basis. In the case
of pS 6= 0, r1× can be calculated as
r1× =
sν,×pν,×− 12ν(0)p0− 12ν(1)pD
pν,×−ν(0)p0−ν(1)pD − pS
1− 2pS .
This is because when r1
′
is the error probability among
the single-photon states detected except for dark counts,
the relation r1
′
= pS(1− r1) + (1 − pS)r1 holds.
C. Approximate single-photon state
Now, in the case of pS = 0, we discuss the distribution
ν taking probabilities not only in the vacuum state and
the single-photon state but also in multi-photon states.
Approximate single-photon state has this form. When
we can generate pulses only with the distribution ν, we
have to treat the rates q2× and q2+ of counuts except for
dark counts of the multi-photon states in the × and +
bases and the error rates r2× and r2+ of the multi-photon
states detected in the × and + bases except for dark
counts as unknown parameters as well as the rate q1 of
counts except for dark counts of the single-photon states
and the error rates r1× and r1+ of the × basis and the +
basis of the single-photon states detected except for dark
counts. Thus, the following equations hold:
pν,×
=ν(0)p0 + ν(1)(pD + q
1) + ν(2)(pD + q
2
×) (30)
pν,+
=ν(0)p0 + ν(1)(pD + q
1) + ν(2)(pD + q
2
+) (31)
sν,×pν,×
=
1
2
ν(0)p0 + ν(1)(
1
2
pD + r
1
×q
1) + ν(2)(
1
2
pD + r
2
×q
2
×)
(32)
sν,+pν,+
=
1
2
ν(0)p0 + ν(1)(
1
2
pD + r
1
+q
1) + ν(2)(
1
2
pD + r
2
+q
2
+),
(33)
11
where q1, q2×, and q
2
+ belong to the interval [0, 1−pD], and
r1×, r
1
+, r
2
×, and r
2
+ do to the interval [0, 1]. The AKG rate
is characterized by the minimum value of q1(1 − h(r1×))
with these conditions. Since it is difficult to calculate this
minimum, we treat the symmetric case, i.e., the case:
pν,× = pν,+, sν,× = sν,+. (34)
Then, the minimum q1min of q
1 and the maximum r1max
of r1× are given as
q1min =
pν,× − p0ν(0)− ν(2)
ν(1)
− pD
r1max =
sν,×pν,× − 12p0ν(0)− 12pDν(1)− 12pDν(2)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2) .
The minimum q1min and and the maximum r
1
max are re-
alized simultaneously when q2× = 1 − pD, r2× = 0. The
minimum of q1(1− h(r1×)) is equal to q1min(1− h(r1max)).
Next, we consider how much AKG rate can be im-
proved when we send pulses generated by different dis-
tributions. For this purpose, we focus on the maximum
q1max of q
1 and the minimum r1max of r
1
×, which are cal-
culated as
q1max =
pν,× − p0ν(0)− ν(2)pD
ν(1)
− pD
r1min ≤ r˜1min :=
sν,×pν,× − 12p0ν(0)− 12pDν(1)− 12pDν(2)− (1− pD)ν(2)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2)pD .
The difference between the maximum and the minimum are given as
q1max − q1min =
ν(2)(1− pD)
ν(1)
r1max − r1min ≤ r1max − r˜1min
≤r1max −
sν,×pν,× − 12p0ν(0)− 12pDν(1)− 12pDν(2)− (1− pD)ν(2)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2) (1−
ν(2)(1− pD)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2) )
=
(1− pD)ν(2)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2)
(
1 +
sν,×pν,× − 12p0ν(0)− 12pDν(1)− 12pDν(2)− (1− pD)ν(2)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2)
)
,
where the inequality a
b+x =
a
b
1
1+ x
b
≥ a
b
(1−x
b
) is applied in
the case of a = sν,×pν,×− 12p0ν(0)− 12pDν(1)− 12pDν(2)−
(1 − pD)ν(2), b = pν,× − p0ν(0) − pDν(1) − ν(2), and
x = ν(2)(1−pD). Hence, when these differences are small
relatively with qmin and rmax, the AKG rate cannot be
improved so much even though we send pulses generated
by different distributions. For example, (1 − pD)ν(2) is
small enough when the generated pulse is close enough
to the single-photon.
When the symmetric assumption (34) does not hold,
the conditions (31) and (33) are added with the con-
ditions (30) and (32). The maximums q1max and r
1
max
become small, and the minimums q1min and r
1
min become
large. Hence, the following relations also hold even in the
non-symmetric case:
q1max − q1min ≤
ν(2)(1 − pD)
ν(1)
r1max − r1min ≤
(1 − pD)ν(2)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2)
(
1 +
sν,×pν,× − 12p0ν(0)− 12pDν(1)− 12pDν(2)− (1 − pD)ν(2)
pν,× − p0ν(0)− pDν(1)− ν(2)
)
.
V. DETAIL ANALYSIS ON EVE’S ATTACK
A. Reduction to three-dimensional outcome
channel
We prove that any Eve’s attack can be reduced by the
attack discussed in Section III. Of course, in the follow-
ing discussion contains the case when the frame of Alice
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does not coincide with that of Bob. Since Alice sends N
pulses and Bob receives N pulses, Eve’s operation can
be described by a CP-TP map EN from the system H⊗N
to the system H⊗N . This description contains the loss
of the communication channel. Even if the detector has
the loss, if the loss does not depend on the measurement
basis, the security is guaranteed by our discussion.
In order to reduce the output system H to three-
dimensional system H0 ⊕H1, we modify our protocol as
follows: In the measurement with the + basis, Bob per-
forms the measurement {|n,m〉}n,m. When (0, 0) is mea-
sured, he decides his final outcome to be ∅. When (n,m)
is measured, he does his final outcome to be 0 with the
probability n
n+m , and 1 with the probability
m
n+m . This
POVM with three outcomes is denoted by {M˜∅, M˜0, M˜1}
on the system H. First, we discuss the security based on
the POVM {M˜∅, M˜0, M˜1}, and after this discussion, we
treat the security with the POVM {M∅,M0,M1}, which
is given in Section II.
The stochastic behavior of the outcome of the POVM
{M˜∅, M˜0, M˜1} is described by the POVM {M ′∅ :=|0〉〈0|,M ′0 := |1, 0〉〈1, 0|,M ′1 := |0, 1〉〈0, 1|} on the sys-
tem H0 ⊕H1 and the TP-CP map E , which are defined
as
Tr M˜iρ = Tr e
′
iE(ρ)
E(ρ) := PH0ρPH0 + PH1ρPH1 +
∞∑
n=2
En(PHnρPHn),
where the TP-CP map En from the n-photon system Hn
(which is equal to the n-th symmetric space) to the sys-
tem H1 is defined by embedding the state ρ on the n-th
symmetric space Hn into n-tensor product system H⊗n1
as
En(ρ) := Tr2,...,n ρ,
where Tr2,...,n means taking partial trace concerning 2-th
- n-th subsystems.
Hence, by extending the system under Eve’s control,
the environment of the TP-CP map E can be regarded
to be under Eve’s control. The channel from Alice to
Bob can be described as the TP-CP map E⊗N ◦ EN from
the system system H⊗N to the system (H0⊕H1)⊗N . We
also assume a stronger ability of Eve, i.e., all states |n, 0〉,
|0, n〉 |n, 0,×〉, |0, n,×〉 can be distinguished by Eve for
n ≥ 2. Then, each pulse can be described as a state on
the system H′ := H0⊕H1⊕ (⊕∞n=2Hn,+)⊕ (⊕∞n=2Hn,×),
where the space Hn,+ is spanned by {|n, 0〉, |0, n〉}, and
the space Hn,× is spanned by {|n, 0,×〉, |0, n,×〉}. Then,
the channel E⊗N ◦EN from Alice to Bob can be regarded
as a TP-CP map from the system H′⊗N to the system
(H0 ⊕H1)⊗N , which is denoted by E ′N in the following.
Now, we focus on following two pinching maps:
Ea(ρ) :=PH1ρPH1 + |0, 0〉〈0, 0|ρ|0, 0〉〈0, 0|
+
∞∑
n=2
|n, 0〉〈n, 0|ρ|n, 0〉〈n, 0|
+ |0, n〉〈0, n|ρ|0, n〉〈0, n|
+ |n, 0,×〉〈n, 0,×|ρ|n, 0,×〉〈n, 0,×|
+ |0, n,×〉〈0, n,×|ρ|0, n,×〉〈0, n,×|,
Eb(ρ) :=PH0ρPH0 + PH1ρPH1 .
By extending the system controlled by Eve, the channel
from Alice to Bob can be regarded as a TP-CP map
EN := Eb ◦ E ′N ◦ Ea from the system H′⊗N to the system
(H0 ⊕ H1)⊗N , due to the forms of the measurement by
Bob and the states sent by Alice.
B. Discrete twirling
In order to define discrete twirling, we define the op-
erators X and Z on the system system H′ by
X|0〉 = |0〉
X| ↑〉 = | ↓〉, X| ↓〉 = | ↑〉
X|n, 0〉 = |0, n〉, X|0, n〉 = |n, 0〉
X|n, 0,×〉 = |n, 0,×〉, X|0, n,×〉 = −|0, n,×〉
Z|0〉 = |0〉
Z| ↑〉 = | ↓〉, Z| ↓〉 = (−1)| ↑〉
Z|n, 0〉 = |n, 0〉, Z|0, n〉 = −|0, n〉
Z|n, 0,×〉 = |0, n,×〉, Z|0, n,×〉 = |n, 0,×〉,
and the operators Xx and Zz for x, z ∈ FN2 by
X
x = Xx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XxN , Zz = Zz1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ZzN .
It is known that if and only if the relation
(XxZz)†EN (XxZzρ(XxZz)†)XxZz = EN (ρ) (35)
holds for any x, z ∈ FN2 , EN has the form of (2). Now,
we define the discrete twirling EN of the map EN :
EN (ρ) := 1
22N
∑
x,z∈FN2
(XxZz)†EN (XxZzρ(XxZz)†)XxZz.
(36)
The operation of ‘discrete twirling’ corresponds to the
following operation: First, Alice generates two random
numbers x, z ∈ FN2 , performs the operation XxZz, and
sends the state via the channel EN , and the classical in-
formation x, z ∈ FN2 via the public channel. Next, Bob
performs the inverse operation (XxZz)† to the received
system. Since the TP-CP map E has the covariance (35),
E has the form (2). However, when Eve’s system is ex-
tended, the implemented channel E is not EN but only
E ′N .
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C. Forward case
In the forward error correction case, by taking into ac-
count the error correction operation, the raw keys can
be regarded to be transmitted via the discrete twirling
of the original channel. The operation concerning x
in (36) is essentially realized by the following opera-
tion. After quantum communication, Alice generates the
random number X and sends the classical information
Y =MeZ +X . Bob regards X
′− Y as the final raw key.
On the other hand, the input and output data are not
changed when the operation corresponding to z. If Al-
ice and Bob perform the operation concerning z in (36),
Eve’s performance is increased only. Hence, in the for-
ward case, the security can be evaluated by analysis on
the channel (2). Note that since our error is symmetric
in the form (2), the error probability can be estimated
from the random variable De.
When we take into account dark counts, any channel
concerning pulses detected expect for dark counts, can
be described by (2) in the forward case. Eve can obtain
all information when the sent pulse is not in the vacuum
state but is detected by dark counts while he cannot ob-
tain any information when the sent pulse is in the vacuum
state and is detected by dark count. Hence, the analysis
in Section III is valid in the forward case.
D. Reverse case
We proceed to the case where all sent states are in
single-photon and the reverse error correction is applied.
Our protocol is given as follows. First, Alice sends the
information bits X with the + basis to Bob via the quan-
tum channel Λ, and Bob obtains the bits X ′ by measur-
ing the received states with the + basis. Bob generates
another random number Z, and sends the classical infor-
mation Y = Z +X ′ to Alice, and Alice regards X − Y
as the final raw keys. Now, we consider the following
modified protocol: Alice generates an entangled pair and
sends one part to Bob. Bob generates another quantum
state with the + bit basis, and performs the Bell mea-
surement {M(0,0),M(0,1),M(1,0),M(1,1)} to the joint sys-
tem of the received system and his original system, where
M(0,0),M(0,1),M(1,0),M(1,1) is the projection correspond-
ing to 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 − |1〉|1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉+
|1〉|0〉), 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉), respectively. Then, he sends
his measurement value to Alice. Alice performs the in-
verse transformation depending on the data to her sys-
tem, and measures it with the + basis. Since the map
from Bob’s input state to the Alice’s final state satis-
fies the covariance (35), this channel is described by the
Pauli channel E(Λ) that is the discrete twirling of Λ. The
latter protocol is essentially equivalent with the former
protocol with the following modification: Bob sends Al-
ice (0, 0) and (0, 1) with the probability 12 in the case of
Y = 0, and sends Alice (1, 0) and (1, 1) with the proba-
bility 12 in the case of Y = 1. Hence, the channel from
Bob to Alice in the former case can be described by the
Pauli channel E(Λ). Therefore, without loss of generality,
we can assume that the original map from Alice to Bob
can be regarded as a Pauli channel.
Now, in order to treat the loss during the transmission,
we modify the latter protocol as follows. Alice performs
the two-valued measurement {T0, T1} before sending one
part of the entangled pair, and sends the state
√
T1ρ
√
T1
only when 1 is detected. In this case, the map from Bob’s
input state to the Alice’s final state can be described by
a Pauli channel. This protocol is essentially equivalent
with the modification of the above former protocol with
the following modification: Alice performs the two-valued
measurement {T0, T1} before sending her state, and sends
the state
√
T1ρ
√
T1 only when 1 is detected. This modi-
fication is equivalent with the lossy channel case.
Next, we consider the case where the number of pho-
tons in the input state is not fixed and no dark count
is detected. In this case, we assume that Eve can know
Bob’s measured value when n-photon state (n ≥ 2) or
the vacuum state is transmitted. It is needed only to
describe the behavior of the counting rates and the error
rates, which are estimated from the random variable Di.
Thus, we can assume that the channel from Alice to Bob
can be described by (2) without loss of generality.
Finally, we consider the case with dark counts. Eve
cannot obtain any Bob’s information for the bits detected
by dark counts. Hence, Eve’s information concerning this
part has no relation with the channel from Alice to Bob.
Any description of this part is allowed. Thus, even if the
dark counts exist, the channel from Alice to Bob can be
described by (2) without loss of generality.
E. Security with the original POVM
We compare the case with the measurement
{M˜∅, M˜0, M˜1} and that with the measurement
{M∅,M0,M1}. The systems controlled by Eve in
these two cases are identical. The error probability
based on the measurement {M∅,M0,M1} is larger than
that based on the measurement {M˜∅, M˜0, M˜1}. Thus,
the estimate of the error rate r1 with the measurement
{M∅,M0,M1} is larger than that with the measurement
{M˜∅, M˜0, M˜1}. Since a larger estimate of r1 gives a
larger size m of sacrifice bits, the security based on the
measurement {M˜∅, M˜0, M˜1} implies the security based
on the original measurement {M∅,M0,M1}.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Applying the relation between Eve’s information and
phase error probability, we have derived useful upper
bounds of eavesdropper’s performances, i.e., eavesdrop-
per’s information and the trace norm between the Eve’s
states corresponding to final keys for the protocol given
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in section II. Here, we have used powerful relations be-
tween the eavesdropper’s performances and the phase er-
ror probability. We have also treated our channel as a
TP-CP map on the two-mode bosonic system, which is
the most general framework. Further, our discussion has
taken into account the effect of dark counts, which forbids
Eve to access Bob’s bits of the pulses detected by dark
count. However, our upper bounds (19) and (20) con-
tain so many random variables that its detail numerical
analysis in the case of phase-randomized coherent light
is very complicated and is separately given in Hayashi et
al [15]. Hence, the future problem for practical QKD is
the numerical calculations of the bounds (19) and (20).
On the other hand, the concrete calculation of the AKG
rate is another future important topic. Also this topics
is separately discussed in Hayashi [16].
We have treated the AKG rate more deeply when the
generated imperfect resource is close to the single-photon.
Since this resource is different from the perfect single-
photon, we need the decoy method. We have compared
the case where only the vacuum state is sent as a different
pulse with the case where additional pulses are sent as
different pulses.
This paper has treated only the binary case. However,
it is easy to extend to the p-nary case, where p is a prime.
In this case, we replace the two-mode bosonic system and
F2 by the p-mode bosonic system and Fp.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Now, we prove Theorem 1. More precisely, we show
the following. (1) An element (x, y)T ∈ Fm2 ⊕Fl2 belongs
the image of (X, I)T with the probability 2−m if x 6= 0
and y 6= 0. (2) it does not belong to the image of the
transpose of any l × (l +m) Toeplitz matrices (X, I) if
x 6= 0 and y = 0.
Indeed, since (2) is trivial, we will show (1). For y =
(y1, . . . , ym), we let i be the minimum index i such that
yi 6= 0. An element (x, y)T ∈ Fm2 ⊕ Fl2 belongs to the
image of (X, I)T if and only if (x, y) = (XT y, y), which
written as the following m conditions.
Yiyi = x1 −
l∑
j=i+1
Yjyj − x1
Yi+1yi = x2 −
l∑
j=i+1
Yj+1yj − x1
...
Yi+m−2yi = xm−1 −
l∑
j=i+1
Yj+m−2yj − x1
Yi+m−1yi = xm −
l∑
j=i+1
Yj+m−1yj − x1
Now, the random variables Yi+m, . . . , Yl+m−1 are fixed.
The m-th condition does not depend on the variables
Y1, . . . Yi+m−2. Hence, the m-th condition only depends
on the variable Yi+m−1. Therefore, the m-th condition
holds with the probability 1/2. Similarly, we can show
that them−1-th condition holds with the probability 1/2
when the m-th condition holds. Thus, the l-th condition
and l − 1-th condition hold with 1/22. Repeating this
discussion inductively, we can conclude that the all m
conditions hold with the probability 2−m.
APPENDIX B: EVE’S STATES
For any Pauli channel E(ρ) =∑x,z∈Fl2 P (x, z)XxZzρ(XxZz)†, the channel to Eve is given by EE(ρ):
EE(ρ) :=
∑
(x,z),(x′,z′)∈F2l2
√
P (x, z)
√
P (x′, z′)TrXxZzρ(Xx
′
Zz
′
)†|(x, z)〉〈(x′, z′)|.
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If the input state is given by |y〉 in the + basis, Eve’s state can be evaluated as follows.
EE(|y〉〈y|)
=
∑
x∈Fl2,z,z′∈Fl2
√
P (x, z)
√
P (x, z′)〈y|Zz−z′ |y〉|(x, z)〉〈(x, z′)|
=
∑
x∈Fl2,z,z′∈Fl2
P (x)
√
P (z|x)
√
P (z′|x)(−1)(z−z′)·y|(x, z)〉〈(x, z′)|
=
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x)|P, y, x〉〈P, y, x|, (B1)
where we define the vector |P, y, x〉 as
|P, y, x〉 :=
∑
z∈Fl2
(−1)z·y
√
P (z|x)|(x, z)〉.
That is, Eve’s state is the stochastic mixture of the state
|P, y, x〉〈P, y, x| with the probability P (x). Then, Eve
loses no information even if she measure the information
x concerning the error of the + basis.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The inequalities (4) and (5) are proved by Hayashi [10].
First, we prove the inequalities (6), (7), (8), and (9). As
is similar to the inequalities (4) and (5), it is sufficient to
show these inequalities for the corrected channel. This is
because the code ImMe/Me(KerMp) with the + basis is
equivalent with the code (Me(KerMp))
⊥/(ImMe)⊥ with
the × basis [10]. Thus, it is sufficient to show
min
y,y′∈Fl2
F (EE(|y〉〈y|), EE(|y′〉〈y′|)) ≥ 1− 2Pph (C1)
max
y,y′∈Fl2
‖EE(|y〉〈y|)− EE(|y′〉〈y′|)‖1 ≥ 4Pph (C2)
min
y∈Fl2
F (EE(|y〉〈y|), ρmix) ≥ 1− Pph (C3)
max
y∈Fl2
‖EE(|y〉〈y|)− ρmix‖1 ≥ Pph, (C4)
where ρmix is the maximally mixed state and the phase
error probability Pph is defined as
Pph :=
∑
x,z∈Fl2,z 6=0
P (x, z) =
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x, 0)− 1.
Since ‖ρ− ρ′‖1 ≥ 2(1−F (ρ, ρ′)), the inequalities (C2)
and (C4) follow from (C1) and (C3). Now, we will prove
(C1) and (C3). Remember the relation (B1). Since
|〈P, y, x|P, y′, x〉| = |
∑
z∈Fl2
(−1)z·(y′−y)P (z|x)|
≥P (0|x)− |
∑
z∈Fl2,z 6=0
(−1)z·(y′−y)P (z|x)|
=P (0|x)− (1− P (0|x)) = 2P (0|x)− 1,
the fidelity F (EE(|y〉〈y|), EE(|y′〉〈y′|)) can be evaluated
as
F (EE(|y〉〈y|), EE(|y′〉〈y′|)) =
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x)|〈P, y, x|P, y′, x〉|
≥
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x)(2P (0|x)− 1) = 2
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x, 0)− 1 = 1− 2Pph,
which implies (C1). Since
〈P, y, x|( 1
2l
∑
y′∈Fl2
|P, y′, x〉〈P, y′, x|)|P, y, x〉
=〈P, y, x|(∑
z∈Fl2
P (z|x)|(x, z)〉〈(x, z)|)|P, y, x〉 ≥ P (0|x)2,
we have
F
(
EE(|y〉〈y|),
∑
y′∈Fl2
1
2l
EE(|y′〉〈y′|)
)
=
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x)
√√√√〈P, y, x|( 1
2l
∑
y′∈Fl2
|P, y′, x〉〈P, y′, x|)|P, y, x〉
≥
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x)P (0|x) =
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x, 0) = 1− Pph,
which implies (C3).
Next, we show (10). The discrimination on the set
of states {EE(|y〉〈y|)}y∈Fl2 can be reduced to The dis-
crimination on the set of states {|P, y, x〉〈P, y, x|}y∈Fl2 .
This set has a symmetry concerning the action of
y′ ∈ Fl2 as Uy′ :=
∑
z∈Fl2(−1)
z·y′ |(x, z)〉〈(x, z)|. Each
one-dimensional subspace spanned by |(x, z)〉 is differ-
ent representation subspace in the space spanned by
{|(x, z)〉}z∈Fl2 . From Holevo[20]’s theory of covariant es-
timator, the minimum average error is given by the fol-
lowing covariant POVM {2−lUy|φ〉〈φ|U †y}, where |φ〉 =∑
z∈Fl2 e
iθz |(x, z)〉. Then, the correct-decision probabil-
ity is given as
2−l|〈P, 0, x|φ〉|2 = 2−l
∣∣∣∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z|x)eiθz
∣∣∣2.
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Its maximal value is (
∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z|x)
√
2−l)2, which is
attained when eiθz = 1. Therefore, the optimal correct-
decision probability of the set {EE(|y〉〈y|)}y∈Fl2 is equal
to
∑
x∈Fl2 P (x)(
∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z|x)
√
2−l)2.
Since (
∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z)
√
2−l)2 is the fidelity between the
uniform distribution and the distribution P , the joint
concavity of the fidelity guarantees that the concavity
of (
∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z)
√
2−l)2 concerning the distribution P .
Thus,
∑
x∈Fl2
P (x)
(∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z|x)
√
2−l
)2
≤
(∑
z∈Fl2
√∑
x∈Fl2
P (x, z)
√
2−l
)2
.
The concavity guarantees that
max
P :P (0)=1−Pph
(∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z)
√
2−l
)2
=
(∑
z∈Fl2
√
1− Pph
√
2−l + (2l − 1)
√
Pph
2l − 1
√
2−l
)2
=
(√
Pph
√
1− 2−l +√1− Pph√2−l)2,
which implies (10).
Applying the concavity of (
∑
z∈Fl2
√
P (z)
√
2−l)2 be-
tween the distributions (1 − Pph, Pph2l−1 , . . . ,
Pph
2l−1 ) and
(1 − P ′ph, P
′
ph
2l−1 , . . . ,
P ′ph
2l−1 ), we obtain the concavity of(√
Pph
√
1− 2−l +√1− Pph√2−l)2 concerning Pph.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Since the condition Z ∈ (MeKerMp)⊥ is equivalent
with the condition MTe Z ∈ ImMTp for Z ∈ FN2 , the
condition (1) is equivalent with the condition:
P{Z ∈ (MeKerMp)⊥} ≤ 2−m for ∀Z ∈ FN2 \ (ImMe)⊥.
Hence, Theorem 3 is essentially equivalent with the fol-
lowing proposition, which we will prove.
Proposition 1 Let C1 ⊂ FN2 be an l + m-dimensional
code. We choose an m-dimensional subcode C2(X) ⊂ C1
satisfying the following condition:
PX{X |x ∈ C2(X)⊥} ≤ 2−m for ∀x ∈ Fn2 \C⊥1 , (D1)
where X is the random variable describing the stochastic
behavior. Alice sends the information C2(X)
⊥/C⊥1 via
the following channel. Here, when she wants to send the
information [x]C⊥1 ∈ C2(X)⊥/C⊥1 , she chooses x′ among
x + C⊥1 with the equal probability 2
l+m−N . The total N
bits can be divided to the following three parts:
n0 bits: no noise (0th part).
n1 bits: at most t bits will be changed (1st part).
n2 bits: no assumption (2nd part).
Using the above classification, Bob recovers the original
information for received information y by the following
way. First, he defines the element Γ(y) ∈ C2(X)⊥ by
Γ(y) := argmax
z∈C2(X):π0(y)=π0(z)
|π1(y − z)|,
where πi is the projection to the above ni bits. Next, Bob
recovers the information [Γ(y)]C⊥1 ∈ C2(X)⊥/C⊥1 .
Then, we obtain
EXpx{[Γ(y)]C⊥1 6= [x]C⊥1 }
≤2n1h( tn1 )+n2−m (D2)
for any [x]C⊥1 ∈ C2(X)⊥/C⊥1 , where px is the conditional
distribution describing the distribution of the output y
with the input x satisfying the above condition.
Proof: From the linearity,
px{[Γ(y)]C⊥1 6= [x]C⊥1 } =p0{[Γ(y)]C⊥1 6= [0]C⊥1 }
=p0{Γ(y) /∈ C⊥1 }.
Hence, it is enough to show
EXPp0{Γ(y) /∈ C⊥1 } ≤ 2n1h(
t
n1
)+n2−m. (D3)
When the original massage is 0, the received signal y
satisfies the conditions π0(y) = 0 and |π1(y)| ≤ t, i.e.,
the distribution p0 has positive probability only on the
set Y := {y|π0(y) = 0, |π1(y)| ≤ t}. Then,
EXp0{Γ(y) /∈ C⊥1 }
=EXp0{y|∃z ∈ C2(X)⊥ \ C⊥1 s.t.|π1(z)− π1(y)| ≤ |π1(y)|}
≤EXp0{y|∃z ∈ C2(X)⊥ \ C⊥1 s.t.|π1(z)− π1(y)| ≤ t}
=
∑
y∈Y
p0(y)PX
{
X
∣∣∣∣ ∃z ∈ C2(X)⊥ \ C⊥1s.t.|π1(z)− π1(y)| ≤ t
}
≤
∑
y∈Y
p0(y)
∑
z:|π1(z)−π1(y)|≤t
PX{X |z ∈ C2(X)⊥ \ C⊥1 }
≤
∑
y∈Y
p0(y)
∑
z:|π1(z)−π1(y)|≤t
2−m (D4)
≤
∑
y∈Y
p0(y)2
n1h(
t
n1
)+n2−m = 2n1h(
t
n1
)+n2−m. (D5)
where the inequality (D4) follows from (D1) and the in-
equality (D5) does from the following inequality:
|{z||π1(z)− π1(y)| ≤ t}| ≤ 2n1h(
t
n1
)+n2 .
Therefore, we obtain (D3).
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APPENDIX E: PROOF OF (16)
Since −(1− x) log(1 − x) ≤ x, we have
h(PPph,min,x|De,POS) + E
P
De,POS(Nη −m)PPph,min,x|De,POS
≤− PPph,min,x|De,POS log(PPph,min,x|De,POS)
+ PPph,min,x|De,POS +NP
P
ph,min,x|De,POS
=PPph,min,x|De,POS(N + 1− logPPph,min,x|De,POS).
Thus, using the concavity of the function x → −x log x,
we obtain (16).
APPENDIX F: PROOF OF (18)
We will prove (18). First, the function q 7→ f(q) :=√
1− p√q+√p√1− q is monotone increasing for q ≤ 1/2
when p ≤ 1/2. This is because the derivative is calculated
as f ′(q) = 12 (
√
1−p
q
−
√
p
1−q ) ≤ 0. Thus,
EPMp,De,POS
(√
PP
ph,min,x|Mp,De,POS
√
1− 2−(ηN−m)
+
√
1− PP
ph,min,x|Mp,De,POS
√
2−(ηN−m)
)2
≤EPMp,De,POS
(√
PP
ph,min,x|Mp,De,POS
√
1− 2−N
+
√
1− PP
ph,min,x|Mp,De,POS
√
2−N
)2
≤
(√
PPph,av,x
√
1− 2−N
+
√
1− PPph,av,x
√
2−N
)2
,
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of(√
Pph
√
1− 2−t +√1− Pph√2−t)2 concerning Pph.
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